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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO

CLEARWATER REI, LLC, BARTON
COLECOCHRAN, CHADJAMES
HANSEN, RONALD D. MEYER,
CHRISTOPHER J. BENAK, AND ROB
RUEB EL
Plaintiffs - Counterdefendants Respondents,

Supreme Court Docket No. 40809-2013
(Ida County Case No. CV OC 1208669)

VS.

MARK BOLING,
Defendant - Counter-Claimant Appellant

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District ofldaho
In and For the County of Ida
HONORABLE DEBORAH BAIL, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING
Rebecca Rainey, Esq. ISB No. 7525
rar@raineylawoffice.com
RAINEY LAW OFFICE
910 W. Main St., Ste. 258
Boise, ID 83702
Tel: (208) 258-2061
Fax: (208) 473-2952
Attorney for Respondents

Mark Boling
maboling@earthlink.net
21986 Cayuga Lane
Lake Forest, CA 92630
Tel: (949) 588-9222
Fax: (949) 588-7078
Appellant, in pro se
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RESPONSE TO RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL

Counterdefendants' restatement of the issues on appeal in Respondents' Brief
("ROB") fails to address, respond to or argue whether Boling's statutory tort claims fall
within the scope of the arbitration clause of the subscription agreement (Issue No. One
in Appellant's Brief ("AOB") at p. 22), which is therefore conceded by
Counterdefendants in this appeal.
Counterdefendants' first restatement of the issues on appeal is unduly narrow in
scope to Idaho contract law and only presents one of the five theories pursuant to which
an arbitration clause can be enforced by or against a non-signatory. See AOB at p. 27.
Counterdefendants' second restatement of the issue on appeal misapplies waiver
by estoppel and misconstrues Idaho law of judicial estoppel for purposes of seeking
arbitration, which was developed in AOB at pp. 34-39.
Counterdefendants' second restatement of the issue on appeal also unduly
restricts the relevant facts upon which judicial estoppel is to be analyzed in this appeal.
RESPONSE TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Counterdefendants are not entitled to attorney fees because the ROB provides no
factual support that this case "was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation" or that Boling's arguments on appeal are
"unsupported by any authority" or "contrary to prior decisions rendered by this Court."
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ARGUMENT

A.

Five theories exist in Idaho to compel a non-signatory party to

arbitration.
Counterdefendants acknowledge that in Arthur Andersen v. Carlisle, 556 U.S.
624, 631-32 (2009) "traditional principles" of state law allow a contract to be enforced
by or against nonparties to the contract through "assumption, piercing the corporate
veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference, third-party beneficiary theories, waiver and
estoppel," ROB at p. 6. These "traditional principles" basically mirror the five theories
quoted in the Thomson-CSF case.
Moreover, subsequent to the Carlisle case, this Court in Wattenbarger v. A.G.

Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 316, 246 P .3d 961, 969 n. 1 (Dec. 2010),
reiterated that the applicable state and federal legal principles of arbitration law are one
and the same. Thus, this Court recognizes that the five theories pursuant to which an
arbitration clause can be enforced by or against a non-signatory (See AOB at p. 28) is
applicable for the state of Idaho as federal legal principles that are indistinguishable
from Idaho's own arbitration principles.
1. Counterdefendants are bound by the arbitration clause based on their close

relationship with the Company and intertwined facts with the Agreement.
Counterdefendants do not dispute in ROB that they had a "preexisting
relationship" as agents for the Company in the formation, distribution, maintenance and
performance of the 2008 Note Program. Instead, Counterdefendants inappropriately
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rely upon General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, Inc., 96 Idaho 691,
696-697 (1975) as authority that an agent by making a contract only on behalf of a
disclosed principal, whom he was power to bind, does not thereby become liable for its
non-performance. ROB at p. 7. However, in the instant case Boling is not seeking
liability against the Counterdefendants for the Agreement's non-performance, e.g.
breach of contract claim. But rather Boling is seeking enforcement of the arbitration
clause against Counterdefendants to assert claims based on Counterdefendants' own
alleged tortuous activities intertwined with the Agreement.
Since both Boling and the Company agreed to the arbitration clause in the
Agreement, a mutuality of remedy exists for that contractual term. 1

Boling may

arbitrate any claims asserted against the Company based on the Counterdefendants'
conduct made in the course and scope of their agency relationship. 2
Boling, as a willing signatory, seeking to arbitrate with Counterdefendants, as a
non-signatory that is unwilling, must establish at least one of the five theories described

"[I]f there were no mutuality ofremedy requirement, the seller--which is usually
the offeree in the real estate sales context--would have absolutely no incentive to initial
the arbitration provision and thereby bind itself to arbitrate disputes." Marcus &
Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co. v. Hock Investment Co., 68 Cal.App.4th
83, 91, fn. 6 (1998).
2
When contracting parties agree to arbitrate all disputes "under or with respect
to" a contract (as they did in the instant case), they generally intend to include disputes
about their agents' actions because "[a]s a general rule, the actions of a corporate agent
on behalf of the corporation are deemed the corporation's acts." In re Merrill Lynch
Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex., 2007).
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in Thomson-CSF, SA. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir.1995). 3
This Court previously stated in Dan Wiebold Ford, Inc. v. Universal Computer
Consulting Holding, Inc., 142 Idaho 235 (2005) that "a nonsignatory can be bound to an

arbitration agreement under ordinary principles of contract and agency," citing the
Thomson-CSP case. See AOB at pp. 28 and 30; See also Mance v. Mercedes-Benz
USA, 901 F.Supp.2d 1147, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citations omitted).

This Court further cites in Dan Wiebold the case of Westra v. Marcus &
Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co. Inc., 129 Cal.App.4th 759 (2005) as an

example of the arbitration principles under the Thomson-CSF case. AOB at p. 28.
Although the Westra case involves the enforcement of arbitration by a non-signatory,
the Westra court states "[a] nonsignatory to an agreement to arbitrate may be required to
arbitrate, and may invoke arbitration against a party, if a preexisting confidential
relationship, such as an agency relationship between the nonsignatory and one of the
parties to the arbitration agreement, makes it equitable to impose the duty to arbitrate
upon the nonsignatory." (citations omitted) Westra at p. 765. Thus, with establishing
one of the five theories described in Thomson-CSP case, an arbitration clause can be

3

The federal courts have identified five theories pursuant to which an arbitration
clause can be enforced by or against a non-signatory: "1) incorporation by reference; 2)
assumption; 3) agency; 4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and 5) estoppel. "Boucher v. Alliance
Title Co., Inc., 127 Cal.App.4th 262, 268 (2005), quoting Thomson-CSP, SA. v.
American Arbitration Ass'n., 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2nd Cir. 1995).
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enforced by or against a non-signatory under Idaho law. 4
In the instant case, the district court ruled "[t]o the extent that the named
individuals were acting in the course and scope of their agency for their principal, their
actions as agents bind their principal but do not convert the agents to parties to the
contract." [R 576, lines 5-7] However, the district court failed to express any analysis,
finding or ruling regarding enforcing the arbitration clause against the non-signatory
Counterdefendants under the theories of agency or equitable estoppel described in
Thomson--CSF case.
Counterdefendants have a close relationship with the Company, as owners,
officers and agents. AOB at pp. 30-32. 5 Also, the operative facts against the
Counterdefendants are inherently inseparable, "intimately founded in and intertwined
with the underlying contract obligations" while acting in the course and scope of their
agency relationship in the formation, distribution, performance and maintenance of the
Agreement and 2008 Note Program. 6 AOB at pp. 34-38. This "close relationship" and
intertwined facts provide a sufficient nexus to justify enforcing the arbitration clause
against the non-signatory Counterdefendants.
4

Counterdefendants fail to mention or respond to the Dan Wiebold and Westra
cases in ROB.
5
The Company is solely owned by the Manager, Counterdefendant Clearwater
REI, LLC. [R 401]
6
Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, claims against the non-signatory
must be dependent upon, or founded in and inextricably intertwined with, the
underlying contractual obligations of the agreement containing the arbitration clause.
Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc., 186 Cal.App.4th 696, 715
(2010)- citing Goldman v. KPMG, LLP, 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 217-218 (2009).
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Furthermore, it is equitable to compel arbitration against the non-signatory
Counterdefendants, as agents for and along with the Company. Counterdefendants'
alleged actionable conduct is attributable to and may create liability for the Company,
which if arbitrated in a complete proceeding with all interested parties eliminates the
risk of inconsistent rulings. 7
Counterdefendants' reliance on the case of Elgohary v. Herrera, 2013 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2116, *12-13 (Tex. App. Mar. 5, 2013) lacks a focus to the issues in this case.
The issue on appeal presented in the Elgohary case is "who properly decides the issue
of arbitrability against a non-signatory-the trial court or the arbitrator." Elgohary at
*1. Counterdefendants cite "[i]f the party resisting arbitration is not a signatory to the
contract, his status as an agent of the signatory entity will not bind him to the arbitration
provision. ROB at pp. 9-10. This citation is made in the context of Elgohary's issue on
appeal, i.e. who decides the issue of arbitrability. Elgohary holds that the court should
decide the issue of arbitrability and then remands the case back to the trial court to
"conduct an independent review to determine whether arbitration could nonetheless be
compelled because of either successor liability under the contract or under any of the six
theories for compelling a non-signatory to arbitrate set forth in In re Merrill Lynch, 235
S. W.3d at 191. Absent such an independent review of arbitrability by the trial court, its

7

At oral argument the district court stated "an agent acting in the scope of his or
her agency binds his or her principal, and if the principal has an agreement to arbitrate,
then the acts of the agents will be evaluated in the context of the arbitration." [RT
22:10-14]
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action in denying the application to confirm and vacating the arbitration award against
Herrera was premature." Elgohary at *7.
Thus, Counterdefendants' reliance on the Elgohary case and the ordinary agency
principles in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293-94 (2002) is misplaced
because these cases look to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute and never
thereafter reviewed the facts under the five theories described in Thomson-CSF for
binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements under theories that arise out of
common law principles of contract and agency law.
Counterdefendants also wrongfully criticize Boling's reliance on Sunkist Soft

Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757-758 (11th Cir. 1993)

re

equitable estoppel and claims intertwined with contractual obligations, as being bad law
after the Carlisle case. ROB at pp. 11-12. As discussed supra, 1) the Carlisle case did
not eliminate "traditional principles" of state law to allow a contract to be enforced by
or against nonparties to the contract, and 2) this Court continues to acknowledge the
five theories described in Thomson-CSF for binding non-signatories to arbitration
agreements.
Finally, Counterdefendants incorrectly rely upon New Mexico's 3-part version
of waiver by estoppel (a different principle) in the case of THI of NM at Hobbs Ctr.,

LLC v. Patton, 2012 WL 112216 (D.N.M. 2012) at *10 to assert that Boling has not
complied with the equitable estoppel principle in Idaho for binding a non-signatory to
an agreement to arbitrate.

ROB at p. 18-19. The Hobbs court later identifies the
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equitable estoppel principal of collusion in Lenox Maclaren Surgical Corp. v.

Medtronic, Inc., 2011 WL 5545420 (10th Cir. 2011) at *6 (unpublished opinion) as
instructive in determining whether a non-signatory is bound by an agreement to
arbitrate. 8 Hobbs at *14-15. In the instant case, waiver by estoppel is not the issue and
Counterdefendants' reliance thereon is inapposite.
2. Counterdefendants are bound by the arbitration clause based on a thirdparty beneficiary relationship with the Company.

Counterdefendants' actionable conduct has a "significant relationship" to the
formation and performance of the Agreement between the Company and Boling,
whereby Counterdefendants were intended direct economic benefit derived from the
Agreement as disclosed therein. See AOB at p. 33.
Boling executed the Agreement with the disclosed "significant relationship" and
economic benefits between the Company and Counterdefendants.
Having taken their intended fruits of the Agreement with Boling in the form of
fees, employment compensation and use of the loan proceeds for projects by other
Clearwater entities owned or operated by the Counterdefendants, an intended direct
benefit was conferred on the non-signatory Counterdefendants as a result of the
Agreement, making the non-signatory Counterdefendants a third party beneficiary of

8

"[A]llegations of collusion will support estoppel only when they establish that
the claims against the nonsignatory are intimately founded in and intertwined with the
obligations imposed by the contract containing the arbitration clause." Hobbs at* 14
citing Medtronic, 2011 WL5545420, at *6.
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the Agreement and arbitration clause therein. 9

B.

Boling has Not Waived his Right to Compel Arbitration
1. No waiver of right to arbitrate exists.

The party seeking the "heavy burden" to prove a waiver of the right to
arbitration must show: "(1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration; (2)
acts inconsistent with that existing right; and (3) prejudice to the party opposing
arbitration resulting from such inconsistent acts." (underline added) Bauscher v.
Brookstone Securities, Inc., 2012 WL 3100383 at *5 (D. Idaho, 2012) (citing Fisher v.
A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir.1986) These requirements are set

forth in the conjunctive, so all requirements must be met before a waiver of right to
arbitrate is established.
Counterdefendants did not set forth in their opposition to Boling's Motion to
Compel Arbitration or in ROB any prejudice that existed under the third requirement.
Counterdefendants do not establish that volumes of discovery were produced in this
case.

Moreover, the burden of participating in discovery is inadequate to show

prejudice. See, Rauscher at *6. Thus, a waiver of right to arbitrate is not established.
2. No judicial estoppel exists.
9

"In order to recover as a third party beneficiary, it is not necessary that the
individual be named and identified as an individual although that is usually sufficient; a
third party may enforce a contract if he can show he is a member of a limited class for
whose benefit it was made. (Citation omitted). Just's v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho
462, 464 (1978) (finding intent to benefit third party class of merchant's within a local
improvement district was evident on the face of the contract)
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Judicial estoppel is the concept "that a litigant who obtains a judgment,
advantage, or consideration from one party through means of sworn statements is
judicially estopped from adopting inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony, to
obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction or
subject matter." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235 (2008) (citing Loomis v. Church,
76 Idaho 87, 93-94 (1954).
In general, there are three elements for a court to consider in evaluating whether
to apply judicial estoppel against a party: "(1) whether a party's later position is 'clearly
inconsistent' with its original position; (2) whether the party has successfully persuaded
the court of the earlier position, and (3) whether allowing the inconsistent position
would allow the party to 'derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on
the opposing party."' United States v. Ibrahim, 522 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.2008).
These requirements are set forth in the conjunctive, so all requirements must be met
before judicial estoppel is established.
Any purported inconsistent position(s) set forth in Boling's Opposition to
Petition to Stay Arbitration does not establish any waiver, supra, or judicial estoppel
because 1) no sworn statements were made, 2) the district court did not rule in favor of
Boling, and 3) the district court makes no mention of or relies on such position(s) in
ruling on the matter. See R 278-279. Also, Boling has not derived an unfair advantage
or impose an unfair detriment on Counterdefendants, based on similar grounds, supra,
that no prejudice under a waiver of right to arbitrate theory exists.
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C.

Counterdefendants Are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.
Counterdefendants are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because 1) the

lawsuit was not "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation." and 2) Boling's arguments on appeal are not deemed to be frivolous as
"unsupported by any authority" or "contrary to prior decisions rendered by this Court."
On September 12, 2012, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Motion to Dismiss and
Motion to Stay Arbitration were heard by the district court. At that time, the Motion to
Dismiss was denied. [R 303,

i! 39] Boling had successfully defended his counterclaims

from dismissal, thereby establishing their merits at the pleading stage.
On February 6, 2013, at the time of oral argument on the underlying Motion to
Compel Arbitration, the district court invited Boling to accept a Rule 54 (B)
certification of the issue on appeal.
"THE COURT: I don't see that you have an
agreement between these parties to arbitrate. And while I
have no question that to the extent that in the agreement
you appropriately have, that you already have that does
require arbitration, there is certainly no question that a
company can be bound by its officers and agents, but then
you are still talking about the principal being the person
or entity compelled to arbitrate.
So I simply don't think there is an adequate basis to
require arbitration. I would be willing to consider giving
you a 54(B) certificate if you wish to raise that issue on
appeal." [RT 10:8-20]

***
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"But I will give you a 54(B) certificate if you desire
so that you can pursue these issues, because it's obvious
that it is a threshold issue, and as you frame it, it seems
to me that it would make some sense to allow you the
option to pursue it with the record that you now have,
which is a better record, to pursue these issues on
appeal if you would desire to do so." [RT 23:12-19]

(emphasis added)
The district court expressly acknowledges Boling as having a threshold issue
with a better record to pursue on appeal.

Additionally, the substantive points and

authorities in Appellant's Brief and Appellant's Reply Brief further speak to the nonfrivolous nature of the appeal.
Consequently, Boling has established that his case is not frivolous, unreasonable
or unfounded and that this appeal presents a threshold issue supported by credible legal

authority. As such, Counterdefendants are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION

Boling seeks to conserve judicial resources and ensure consistent substantive
rulings on his claims by compelling arbitration of Counterdefendants along with the
Company. Boling submitted in support of his motion to compel arbitration admissible
evidence, including newly discovered evidence in discovery on a new and different
motion that warrants a different conclusion to the district court's 10/16/12 ruling [R
278-279] and 217113 ruling [R 575-577]. Based on the foregoing, Boling respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the district court's 217/13 ruling [R 575-577] with
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direction to compel arbitration against Counterdefendants, and each of them, based on
Boling's initial demand for arbitration filed with the AAA on February 15, 2012.
Furthermore, Boling requests that Counterdefendants are not entitled to attorney fees on
appeal.
Respectfully submitted.

Dated: August 9, 2013
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